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NOTES.
SUPREME COURT REPORTS.--At the request of the Reporter of the
Supreme Court of the United States the following announcement is
made in regard to the publication of the Official Reports:
"Last July Congress passed an act (Public No. 272) providing
for the publication of the Official Reports of the Supreme Court in the
Government Printing Office and for their sale to the public at cost of
production, including a part of the appropriation made for the maintenance of the Reporter's office. The last contract with a private
publishing house expired with the publication of Volume 256, which
completed the reports for the October, 192o, Term. The letting of a
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new contract to cover the opinions of the i921 Term was impracticable, owing to the pendency of the legislation, to the expectation
that it would be enacted long before it actually was, and to definite indications that, when enacted, it would supersede the contract method.
"For various reasons, incident to the ending of the old contract
and the legislative change, editorial work on the opinions of the 1921
Term was seriously delayed. Time also was consumed in making
necessary preparations in the printing office. Notwithstanding this,
however, gratifying progress has been made. The reports of these
opinions will be contained in three volumes to be numbered 257, 258
and 259, all of which, it is confidently expected, will be published in
bound and pamphlet form before the close of the year.
"The act provides for advance parts as well as bound volumes,
when ordered by th6 Chief Justice. It was decided to issue a small
edition of these pamphlets, four to a volume. These, as heretofore,
are made from the plates used in the final volumes and, therefore, correspond with them in page numbering. Three numbers, containing
three-fourths of the opinions of Volume 257, have already beeh issued. The price is twenty-five cents per number. The bound volumes
will follow the corresponding pamphlets as soon as the plates can
be re-examined and corrected and the tables and indexes completed
and plated. According to present estimates, the price of bound
volumes wilU be about two dollars and ten cents each.
"Especial attention is directed to the fact that it will not be
necessary to send in a separate order for each pamphlet or volume
purchased. Standing orders with advance deposits will be received
by the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office,
Washlington, D. C., and the publications will be mailed, as issued, to
the addresses given, as long as the amounts kept on deposit suffice to
pay. for them."
RESTRAINT OF INTERSTATE COMIMERCE UNDER TIE SiiERMAN

ANTI-TRUST AcT.--"My analysis of the judicial process cones then

to this, and little more: logic, and history, and custom, and utility,
and the accepted standards of right conduct, are the forces' which
singly or in combination shape the progress ofotbe law. Which of
these forces shall dominate in any case, must depend largely upon the
comparative importance or value of the social interests that will be
thereby .promoted or impaired."' It is easily perceived that all of
the forces here mentioned have played some part, great or small, in
the important decisions that have been rendered under the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act.2 The fact that the members of our Supreme Court
"Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, ziI
Act of July 2,i8o, ch. 647, 26 Stat. -9. As this Note will deal principally with Sections I and 2, the pertinent parts thereof are here given. "Every
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have disagreed on numerous occasions as to the relative importance of
the public interests to be affected by a particular decision justifies the
difference of opinion with which certain rulings have been received.3

Just as it is difficult, after reading the cases that have arisen

under the antil-trust statute, to lay down any definite rule as to what
constitutes interstate commerce, 4 so it approaches the impossible to
define exactly what is required by the courts to constitute a restraint
of commerce among the states. A point much more hotly contested
in the recent case Of The United Mine Workcrs of Anmerica v. The
Coronado Coal Co., et al.,' than the popularly quoted one concerning
the suability of unincorporated associations," was that which had to
do with the question as to whether there had been an interference
with such commerce within Section i of the statute.,

There are three problems, among others, as to which it may be
said some uncertainty exists: (i) If the Sherman Act is to apply,
must the effect of the contract, conspiracy or combination be a
direct and immediate restraint upon interstate commerce or is it sufcontract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states or with foreign na-

tions, is hereby declared to be illegal...
"Sec. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize,
or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize -any
part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign.
nations, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
'See 3 Cot. L Rt.v. z68, 221, 304 (1903); 17 HArY. L REV. 474, 533
(i9o4); 19 Mlicu. L RLv. I, 2T (192o); 59 U. oF PA. L. Riw. 61 (:gio).
'MAr. Justice Harlan, in United States v. F. C. Knight, 156 U. S. I, 39
L. ed. 325, 15 SUp. Ct. 249 (:894),'said that the decisious of the Snpreine Court
fully answer the question as to what constitutes commerce among the states.
lie then quoted from the often approved words of Chief Justice Marshall, in
Gibbons v. Ogden, 9 Vheat. i, 6 L. ed. 23 (x824) : "Commerce, undoubtedly, is
traffic, but it is something more; it is intercourse." It includes, said the court,
such traffic or trade, buying, selling, and interchange of commodities, as directly affects or necessarily involves the interests of the People of the United
States. Other of our courts have been impressed with the difficulty of definipg commerce. Hopkins v. United States, 1y1 U. S. 578, 587, 43 L ed. 2po,
19 Sup. Ct. 40 (1898).
'U. S. Adv. Ops., 643, 42 Sup. Ct. 570 (1922). lVhen the superintendent
of the plaintiff coal mines declared his intention of running the mines on a
non-union or open basis, the officers of District No. 21 of the United Mne
Workers, the defendants below, immediately declared a local strike. Subsequently the mines were attacked by union men, property destroyed, and the
non-union employes driven out. On this ground and the a.dditional complaint
that there was a definite campaign on foot to unionize all the mines and thus
destroy competition, the plaintiffs sought to have District No. 21 held under
the first and second sections of tile Anti-Trust Act. It was held that the
evidence was insufficient to show that District No. 21 intended to interfere

with interstate commerce.
I See Recent Cases, infra, p.
'See

Note 2 supra.
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ficient that such commerce should be ultimately hindered? ' (2) In
order to convict under the act, must it be proved that the defendant
had the intention to restrain interstate commerce or will it suffice that
the effect of the combination, regardless of intent, was so to hinder
the trade? (3) What is the test as to whether there is or is not an
illegal restraint? Is it that of reasonableness? Is it the extent to
which the restraint is exercised?
The doubt in connection with the first question rests more on the
confusing use of phrases than on inconsistent decisions. The courts
talk a great deal about "voluntary and involuntary restraints," "lawful and unlawful restraints,!' "restraint of competition and restraint
of trade,.... reasonable and unreasonable restraints." Some of the
cases, on the other hand, present a straightforward and comprehensive statement, from which it would appear to be unquestionable that
the Sherman Act does not apply unless interstate commerce has been
directly affected by the alleged contract or combination. 9 And yet in
the Coronado Coal Company case, Chief Justice Taft said :10 "W¥e
have had occasion to consider the principles governing the validity of
congressional restraint of .
. indirect obstructions to. interstate commerce in Swift v. United .Siates;" United States v. Pattcn;'" Unitcd States v. Ferger;3 . . . It is clear from these cases that
if Congress deems certain recurring practices, though not really part
of interstate commerce, likely to obstruct, restrain or burden it, it has
the power to subject them to national supervision and restraint." It
is to be noted that the defendant in the Swift ', and Patten 15 cases
'An example of a combination resultnsg in a direct restraint upon interstate
commerce is that of railroads which unite for the purpoie of controlling
prices. United States v. The Trans-Missouri Freight Association, i66 U. S.
290, 41 L. ed. loo7, 17 Sup. Ct. 540 (z897) ; whereas a combination which would
result in an indirect interference with interstate trade is the running of a
"corner" in some important commodity. See, however, ,Note is hfra. See,
generally, the opinion by Judge Taft, then on the circuit bench, in the Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. case, 85 Fed. 21t, 29 C. C. A. 141 (1,89s).
'On the ground that this fequirment was not complied with, the complaint in the first important case to arise under the Act of i89o was dismissed.
United States v. E. C. Knight Co., supra in Note 4, and in Ilopk.'ns v. United
States, supra in Note 4: Anderson v. United States, 171 U. S. 6o4, 43 L ed.
300, 19 Sup. Ct. 5o ('8g>) ; and Field v. Barber Asphalt Company, 194 U. S.
6W8, 48 L. cd. x142, 24 Sup. Ct. 784 (i9o4). See 59 U. OF PA. L REv. 6r, 72

(91o).

ap. 657.

21

196 U. S. 375, 49 "L. ed. 518,

1 226 U.

S.

25

Sup. Ct. 276 (i9o5).

525, 57 L. ed. 333, 33 Sup. Ct. r41 (1913).

U. S. i99, 63 L ed. 936, 39 Sup. Ct. 145 (ig1).
"The court in that case, however, said that the combinattln of the meat
dealers not to bid against each other in the stock markets, to fix prices, *and to
get less than lawful rates from the railroads to the exclusion of competitors.
1225o

had as a direct object the restraint of interstate trade. ".

.

. its effect upon

commerce among the states is not accidental, secondary, remote or merely
probable." p. 397.
" T here the court held that a conspiracy to run a "corner" in the available
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were charged and relief -was granted under the anti-trust act. Then,
further, the court in the Patten case drew a distinction between voluntary and involuntary restraints, including, in the former, agreements
whereby persons engaged in interstate trade or commerce undertake
to suppress competition among themselves, and, in the latter, combinations "where persons not so engaged conspire to comoel -action
by others, or to create artificial conditions, which necessarily impede
or burden the due'course of such trade or commerce or restrict the
common liberty to engage therein." 26 It would seem,'therefore, that
the proper answer to the first question,, although not clearly enunciated in any of the cases, is that, in indicting or seeking an injunction under the Sherman Act, it must be averred that there has been
either, (i) a contract or combination resulting in a direct obstruction to interstate commerce, or (2) a contract, combination, or conspiracy resulting in an indirect hindrance and that the defendants
had the intention to interfere with commerce among the states.1 Justice Lurton, in United States v. Reading Companys intimates the
possibility of such division. "Of course if the necessary result is
materially to restrain trade between the States, the intent with which
the thing was done is of no consequence. But when there is only a
probability, the intent to produce the consequences may become im, portant." 19
If it is correct thus to classify proper indictments and petitions
for relief under the Act of xS9jo, then the second suggested problem
is greatly simplified. The classification would explain the Chief Justice's statement in the Coronado Case that, "It was necessary, however, in order to h6ld [the defendantsl liable in this suit .- under the
Anti-Trust Act, to establish that this conspiracy to attack the BacheDenman mines and stop the non-union employment there, was with
intent to restrain interstate commerce and to mohopolize the same,
and to subject it to the control of the union." 21 The court said that
cotton supply, thereby artificially enhancing its- price through the country, was

within Section r of the Act. Here again, however, the court treated the combination as a direct restraint as in Swift v. United States, supra, in Note 14.
S. 274, 293, 3o, Vz L. cd. 488, 28 Sup.
" See, also, Loewe v. Lawlor, .08 ToU.
Ct. 301 (io8).

"In Burton v. Clyne, U. S. Adv. Ops, 469, 42 Sup. Ct. 397 ('ig9), Chief
Justice Taft, referring to the Swift case, said: ". . . the intent of the conspiracy charged in the indictment . . . tied kogether the parts of the scheme
there attacked, and imported their direct effect upon interstate commerce."
p. 47&

" 226 U. S. 324, 5i L. ed. 243, 33 Sup. Ct 9o (1912).
iP. 370.
"The facts are given in Note 5 supra.

21p. 655.
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it was there dealing with an ;idirect obstruction and hence it was
necessary to find intent.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that the intention with
which the defendants entered into the alleged contract, combination,
or conspiracy is unimportant. Mr. Justice Van Devanter, speaking
for the majority of the court in United States v. Patten, gave expression to the usual statement,22 "And that there is no allegation of
a specific intent to restrain such trade or commerce [is immaterial],
for, as is shown by prior decisions of this court, the conspirators
must be held to have intended the necessary and direct consequences
of their acts and cannot be heard to say the contrary." 2 3 And concerning the propriety of such a ruling there can be no doubt. The
words of the statute are clear and do not require, in addition to the
illegal combination or conspiracy, a present intention to restrain or
obstruct interstate commerce.
In considering the third question-as to what is the test to determine whether there has been an illegal restraint-it -isnecessary at
the outset to distinguish between a restraint of interstate commerce
and a restraint of competition in interstate trade. The court in
Unitcd States v. Da Pont De Nemours & Co.2 4 pcinted out that even
under the anti-trust act, there may be a restraint of competition
which does not amount to a restraint of interstate commerce..2 5 A
leading authority in support of this distinction is United States v. U. S.
Steel Corp. et aL20 Although one of the objects of the Sherman
A;t undoubtedly was to maintain competitive conditions in interstate
trade, yet it should not be interpreted as condemning all agreements
that may restrain competition.
The argument was made,2" shortly after the passage of the AntiTrust Act, that it was meant to prohibit only unreasonable restraints,
but the court, by a majority of one, refused to accept such a view.
P.543.
=In support of this statement were cited Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v.
United States, 175 U. S.211, 243, 44 L. ed. z36, 20. Sup. Ct. .6 (i8ft), and
United States v. Reading Co., 226 U. S. 34, 37c, 57 L ed. 243, 33 Sup. Ct. go
(1912). See also United States v. Union Pacific R. R. Co., 226 U. S. 6t, 88,
57 L ed. 124, 33 Sup. Ct. 53 (i9r2), and International Harvester Co.v. United
States, 234 U. S. z99, 209, ,5 L ed. 1276, .34 Sup. Ct. 859 (1914).

188 Fed. 127.
Before the passage of the Sherman Act, it was possible likewise to have
a restraint of competition that did not amount to a common-law restraint of
trade. United States v. Trans-Missouri Freght Association, supra in Note 8.
'251 U. S. 47, 64 L. ed. 343, 40 Sup. Ct. 293 (392o).
' In United States v. Trans-Mfissouri Freight Assoc., supra in Note 8, and
United States v. Joint Traffic Association, 171 U. S.505, 43 L ed. 259, i9Sup.
Ct. 25 OW08).
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The act referred to all restraints and the court construed it strictly.25

However, this opinion was not followed very long and finally in the
Standard Oil and Tobacco Cases,2 9 the so-called "rule of reason" was
definitely adopted.30 In line with this rule, we find the court in the
principal case considering the extent of the effect upon interstate commerce which the defendants' acts had had. The entire coal production
of District No. 21 was 15o,ooo tons a week; that of the plaintiff mines
5ooo tons, so the court said the defendants' acts of destruction had
no appreciable effect upon interstate competition.
The course of decisions which the Supreme. Court has been
called upon to render under this far-reaching statute, shows a steady
evolution and development just as is the case with that in any other
important and constantly litigated field of the law. Two facts stand
out clearly from the mass of learned discussion indulged in by the
courts. First, and this is amounced in Unitcd Jlhue Workers of
Amncrica v. Thc Coronado Coal Co., there is included within the language of Sections x and 2 of the anti-trust act, in addition to the condemnation of direct and immediate restraints upon interstate commerce, a penalty for indirect obstructions, provided in the latter
case that there be an intent to hinder the intercourse among the
states.31 In the second place, the more recent cases show that the
"'Justice Brewer, who had concurred in the majority opinion, in a later
case-United States v. Northern Securities Co, 193 U. S. 197, 4S L. ed. 679,
24 Sup. Ct. 436 (94)---said the former decision should have been based on
the fact that the restraint was unreasonable. Only unlawful restraints and
monopolies should be included in the act, he announced his changed opinion
to be.
' Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U. S. x, 55 L. ed. 6x9, 31 Sup.
Ct. 502 (1911); United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U. S. Io6, SS L
ed. 663, 31 Sup. Ct.'532 (19i).
"However, it nmust not be taken that these cases contain the first statement of the rule. M.iany courts had used similar langiage at an earlier date.
"An agreement entered into for the purpose of promoting the legitimate
business of an individual or corporation with no purpose to thereby affect or
restrain interstate commerce and which does not directly restrain such commerce, is not, as we think, covered by the act, although the agreement indirectly and remotely affect that commerce. United States v. Joint Traffic
Assoc., supra in Note 27.
' Whether such an interpretation vas within the contemplation of the framers of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act, is difficult to say. However, it would not
be the first instance in which a different view was taken from that which the
committee had in mind. Senator Hoar, a member of the Judiciary Committee which submitted the Act, later said before .the Senate (January 6, 1903):
"We undertook by law to clothe the courts wit.a the power and impose on
them and the Department of Justice the duty of preventing all combinations in
restraint of trade. It was believed that the phrase, 'in restraint of trade,' had
a technical and well understood meaning in the law. It was not thought that
it included every restraint of trade, whether healthy or injurious. We were
disappointed in one particular. The Court by one majority [in U. S. v. Joint
Traffic Assoc., supra in Note 27] and against the very earnest and emphatic
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courts in rendering great decisions compare the "importance or value
of the social interests that will be thereby promoted or impaired." For
some years after the passage of the Sherman Act, the courts considered only the strict language of the statute, rejecting entirely the
contention that the term "in restraint of trade" had a "technical and
well understood meaning in the law." 32 Then gradually, impressed
no doubt with the incontrovertible argument that to continue such
policy would be to retard seriously the economic growth of our country's business, the Supreme Court regarded the statute more in the
light of the conditions under which it was passed and the immediate
evils it was calculated to remedy. 33 The confusicn in our cases has
been largely due to the varied use of the technical phrase, "in restraint of trade"; but the Supreme Court has probably once and for
all come to a proper interpretation of it.

E.G.H.
Tim UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF TIE FEDERAL TAx oN EMPr.oyCiiiLD LABOR.-That the oft-repeated statement "the power to
tax involves the power to destroy" i does not with all its seemihig
significance pertain to the taxing power of Congress under the Constitution 2 is the conclusion which must be drawn from the decision
in Bailey v. Drcxel Furniture Co.3 The court there held that the
Child Labor Law 4 imposing a tax upon all persons employing children of specified ages was unconstitutional. An analogy was drawn
between this case and Haminer v. Dagenhart1 insofar as the statutes
iiRS OF

dissent of some of its great lawyers, declined to give a technical meaning to
the phrase and held . . . that if trade were restrained by an agreement
it was no matter whether it were injuriously restrained or not."

" See Note 31 spra.
"See Judson, Interstate Commerce, 139 (3rd ed.). Also Chief Justice
White in Standard Oil Co. v. United States, supra in Note c9, at p. 59'Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 43r, 4
L ed. 316 (Vol. 4), (U. S. Sup. Ct., 18ig).
'Art. I, Sec. 8. "The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes,
duties, imposts and excises, to pay the debts and provide for the common defence and general welfare of the United States
3 4 Sup. Ct 449 (1922).
Following this decision and in accord with it
are Hill et al. v. Wallace, 42 Sup. Ct. 453 (1922) and Lipke v. Lederer, i7 U.
S. Adv. Ops. 6n2, 66 L. ed. 61z (i922).
4Act. Feb. 24, i91. Tit s2, Sec. 120o. A tax of ten per cent. on the net
profits was imposed bn every person operating a mine or quarry in which
children under sixteen were employed for any part of the year or on any person operating a mill, cannery, workshop or factory employing children under
fourteen or employing children between fourteen and sixteen for more than
eight hours a day and six days a week.
.247 U. S. 25r, 62 L ed. xroi, 38 Sup. Ct. 529 (1918). This held that
Congress could not under its power to regulate commerce, Art. I, See. 8 of
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in both cases sought to extend the federal power to the domains of the
police power reserved to the states.8 Hammer v. Dagehart will not
be commented upon here; it involved purely the interpretation of the
7
commerce clause and itself gave rise to much discussion. The instant
case, however, is especially noteworthy in the light of the trend of decisions which, during the last century, dealt with the federal taxing
power.
That the imposition of taxes, in addition to raising revenue, has
an incidental prohibitory effedt was present to the minds of the framers of the Constitution. Hamilton, in referring to a tax on spirits,
said, "and if it should tend to diminish the consumption of it such
an effect might be equally favorable to the agriculture, to the economy,
to the morals and to the health of society." s History is replete with
examples of such uses of taxation.9 The opinion of able jurists and
text-writers has been that the theory of taxation included as a matter
of course the power of regulation, and that, therefore, by bestowing
0
the power of taxation upon Congress, with but three exceptions,
the founders of the nation meant to entrust that power to it with all
its regulatory possibilities.11 The decisions of the Supreme Court
up to this time have continually held as constitutional acts in which
revenue was not the prime motive.1 " The courts refused to inquire into
the Conistitution, exclude from interstate commerce articles in the making of
which child labor took part.
'Article X of Amendments to the Constitution. "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the
States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people."
'See 35 HARv. L Rmx. 359 (1922); 67 U. oF P,,. L Ra,. 21 (i919).
* The Federalist, No. iz
'See farshall's Life of Washington, Ch. 7, 482-487, on the imposing of
duties and embargoes during the commercial war at the end of the eighteenth
century.
" Art. I, Sec. & "But all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States." Art. I, Sec. 9. "No capitation, or Gther direct,
tax shall be laid unless in proportion to the census or enumeration hereinbefore directed to be taken." "No tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported
from any state." In McCray v. U. S., 195 U. S. 27, 49 L. ed. 78, 24 Sup. Ct.
769 (i9o4), it is said that there are some rights which could not be destroyed by the taxing power. These are "the fundamental rights which no
free government could censistcntly violate." The sale of oleomargarine was
held not to be such right; the employment of child labor certainly is not.
'Hare, American Constitutional Law, Vol I, --,g3 (zS89); Wagner, 2
Finan.zisscnschaft 2 o, 2nd ed. (189o); Story on the Constitution, 711, Vol. 1,
sth ed. (189I); Seligman, Esays in Taxation 4o2 (9th ed., 792t). Other
writcrs maintain that the taxing power can only be used to raise revenue.
Cooley on Taxation, 191, Vol i (3d ed., z9o3); Andrew A. Bruce in 3 Mxxx.
L RE%. lO2 (1919).
-Veasie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U. S. 533, i9 L ed. 482 (869). The tax was
intended to put state bank currency out of existence. The court held that the
taxing power was subject to no limitation and also that it was within the power
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the motives of Congress in order to find
tnat it was using one of its
3
powers for unconstitutional purposes.
Chief Justice Taft in distinguishing the principal case from the
preceding ones says, "But there comes a time in the extension of the
penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as
such and becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment." This sets up an indefinite limit beyond which
a tax will be called a penalty. The limit is not only wholly indefinite
but new to the law. The act taxing oleomargarine which was held
constitutional in JfcCray v. United States," a was intended to be
and was, as destructive as the Child Labor Law. The court further
said that the Child Labor Act shows on its face a regulatory intention. Since the court is not supposed to look to the notives of the
legislators it seems of little consequence whether the motive is expressed or hidden. 4 That the tax was on a method of doing business which method is within the control of the state only was also
argued in Flint'v.Stone Tracy Co., but with no success. The stipulation that the person who is deceived as to the age of his child employee need iot pay the tax ' does, indeed, indicate the pena.lizing
purpose of the act. But that again involves the motive of Congress.
Moreover, even if the judiciary were willing to look into the
motives of Congress, there is authority for holding that Congress is
justified in using its delegated functions for so-called police purposes.
Chief Justice Taney said,18 "But what are the police powers of a
state? The police powers are nothing more or less than the powers of
government inherent in every sovereignty to the extent of its dominof Congress to secure a national currency. In re Kollock, j65 U. S. 5-6, 41
L. ed. 813, 17 Sup. Ct. 444 (1897). United States v. Doremus, 249 U. S. 86,
63 L. ed. 493, 39 Sup. Ct. 214 (i99) held constitutional an act passed to regulate sales of drugs.
I Chief Justice Marshall, in McCulloch v. Maryland, vupra, in Note 1. "It
is a perplexing inquiry unfit for the judicial department, what -degree of taxation is the legitinate use and what degree may amount to an abuse of the
power." In McCray v. United States, 195 U. S.27, 49 L. ed. 78, 24 Sup. Ct.
769 (i9o4), it was said: "The decisions of this court from the beginning
lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the
exercise of a lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or
motive has caused the power to be exerted." Hamilton v. Kentucky Distilleries Co., 251 U. S.146, v5i, 64 L. ed. r9-1, 4o Sup. Ct. io6 (rgg).
"'- For citation see Note 13 supta.
"Congress made .fts purpose known in the title of tile Lottery Act of
March 2, 1895, c. 19i, 28 Stat. 963. "An Act for the Suppression of Lottery Traffic through National and Interstate Commerce."
S Section 1203 (b). The words of the court are "Scienters are associated with penalties, not with taxes:'
The License Cases, 5 How. 5o4, 583, z2 L ed. 256 (U. S. Sup. Ct.
847).

NOTES

ions. ....
The authority to pass it cannot be made to depend
upon the motives that may be supposed to have influenced the legislature, nor can the court inquire whether it was intended to guard the
citizens of the state from pestilence and disease or to make regulations of commerce for the interests and convenience of trade." ITFurther, it has been said "and the powers reserved to the states and those
conferred on the nation are adapted to be exercised, whether independently or concurrently, to promote the general welfare, material
and moral." 1 8
The Child Labor Act, if it differs at all from the previous acts
which had been upheld, does so by combining in itself all the elements which aroused objection in the other acts severally-excessive
amount of tax, 9 taxing a process of business, -0 accompanying provisions for detailed specifications and inspections.2' To these are added
the elements of knowledge of the taxpayer and the fact that the tax
must be paid whether one or many children are employed. Granting
that all these elements strongly indicate the prohibitive feature of the
act, based solely on precedent the act could have been held constitutional.
By holding the hct unconstitutional the court strengthens the
belief formed after Hammer v. Dagenhart that the high-water.mark
of broad interpretation of federal power had been reached. First the
check was applied to the conmdrce power and: now to the power of
taxation, a power which was always known as one of the broadest and
most arbitrary possessed by Congress. 2 2 The cause for this may be
a natural reaction from the great centralization of power during the
war, or it may arise from an earnest belie that there will be a more
efficient administration of the laws by strenthening the state governments instead of the federal. 3 Whatever influence there may have
been in arriving at the decision, the fact remains that this case sets a
precedent foi= judicial intervention. The Supreme Court takes upon
itself the duty of deciding whether Congress in exercising one of its
U

"They were entrusted to the general government for the good of the

nation." Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U. S. r,
9, 24 L. ed. 708 (1877).
" Hoke v. Unitd States, 227 U. S. 322, 57 L. ed. 523, 33 Sup. Ct. 2S1

(1917).

" Veasie Bank v. Fenno, supra in Note 12; McCray v. United States, supra
in Note 13.
" Flint v. Stone Tracy Co, 22o U."S. 107, 55 L. ed. 389, 31 Sup. Ct. 342
(0g9i).
' United States v. Doremus, supra in Note xz
'License Tax Cases, 5 Wall 462, 471, IS L. ed. 497 (U. S. Sup. Ct.
1866).
='Of interest in'this connection is the Attorne5.-General's article, supra,

p. 1.
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powers is doing so for the purpose for which the court believes that
power was given. This departs from the theory that the matter of
the proper use of legislative power was one between Congress and the
electors. 2
S.A.G.
SOME RIGHTS IN MNOTION PrCTURE.--Is the tendency of a motion picture film toward the promotion of the progress of science or
the useful arts? And is a film a "witing"? I Early in this century
these questions were answered in the affirmative.2 As a result, the
products of the great, growing motion picture industry are entitled3
to copyright under the Constitution's grant of power to Congress
Once a photograph had been held to be a "writing," 4 it was not a
far step to the decision that motion picture films belonged in the
same category. Though neither Section 86 of the Copyright Act of
i87o, "' nor Section 4 of the Act of i9o9,0 specifically mentioned films
as subject to copyright privileges, the courts had so regarded them.?
The Amendment of 1912 s specifically provides for such films, so it
"Veasie Bank v. Fenno, supra in Note i2, at p. 548.
'Article 1,Section 8, of the Federal Constitution provides: "The Congress
shall have power . . . to promote the progress of science and useful arts,
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to
their respective writings and discoveries." In regard to the makter of "useful arts," see the circus-poster case of Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing
Co., I88 U. S. 239, 47 L. ed. 46q, 23 Sup. Ct. :98 (1903).
In this Note the only cases dealt with are those arising under United
States Acts.
'The first case dealing with a "current events" reel is Edison v. Lubin,
T22 Fed. 240, 58 C. C. A. 6o4 (19o3), reversing irg Fed. 993 (D. C. i9o3) ;
the first to protect a photoplay was American, etc, Co. v. Edison Mfg. Co.,
137 Fed. 262 (C. C. T905). They were decided under Section 4952 of the Revised Statutes (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 34o6). See also, Harper & Bros. v.
Kalem Co., :ig Fed. 6z, 94 C C. A. 429 (19o9).
'Copyright is solely a creature of statute "It is a right . . . which
hardly can be conceived except as a product of statute, as the authorities now
agree": Holmes, J., in White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co., aog U. S. 1, 19,
See also Wheaton v. Peters, 3
52 L. ed. 65;5, 663, 28 Sup. Ct. 319, 324 (1907).
Pet. (U. S.) 591, 8 L ed.. 105 (1834); New Fiction Pub. Co. v. Star Co., 220
Fed. 994 (D. C. 19t5).

"Burrow-Giles Lithographing Co. v. Sarony, III U. S.53, _8 L ed. 349,
4 Sup. Ct. 279 (:884).
'The Copyright Act of July 8, i87o (U. S. Stat. at Large, c. 23o).
'The Copyright Act of 19o9 (Act of March 4, 19o9, c. 320, 35 Stat. 1075
[Comp. St. 1913, Sect. 9517]).

'Edison v. Lubin, sutra in Note 2; American, etc., Co. v. Edison Mfg. Co.,
.utra in Note 2; Harper & Bros. v,Kalem Co., supra in Note 2.
'The Act of August 24, 1912, c. 356, 37 Stat. 488. Those sections of the
Act of 19o9 which have been amended to include motion pictures are Sections
5, Ii and 25.

NOTES
is now clear that they are intended by Congress to be considered
"writings."
Under the protection accorded its products by the law the motion
picture industry has grown with- extraordinary rapidity, and with
its growth the value of all literary property possessing any substantial dramatic qualities has increased. Today *there are four great
rights recognized in such literary works: book (novel or short story),
"serial" (understood among publishers as consisting of magazine'and
newspaper privileges), dramatic, and motion picture scenario rights.lo
"Copyright is not an aristocratic institution." 11 Neither literary
nor artistic merit in the least degree is required. 2 Various terms in
the Act have been liberally construed I" so as to include motion pictures within their scope. A film is a "writing," 1, and the story its
showing unfolds is deemed a "drama." I" An employer who hires
men to produce a photoplay is an "author." 16 Not the production of
a film based on a novel, but rather its exhibition on the screen is the
"dramatization" of the novel within the meaning of the Act." In determining whether dramatization has occurred "tie essence of the
matter . . . is not the mechanism employed but that we see the
The Act is silent in regard to the time when
event or story lived."
For a discussion of the full scope of the word "writings," as used in the
Act, see Section 495 et seq. of Weil's excellent work on Copyright Law (1917).
" See New Fiction Pub, Co. v.*Star Co., supra in Note 3.
"Weil on Copyright Law, Section 482.
"'Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., supra in Note i. "The degree
of merit required by the judicial critics need not discourage any one from
entering the field of literature' or art": B. S. Rogers' The Subject Matter of
Copyright, WSU. OF P.4. L. Rnv. 223 (1920).
Our Copyright Acts are intended to be liberally construed: Myers v. callaghan, 5 Fed. 726 (C. C. 1881); Ford v. Blaney Amusement Co., 148 Fed. 642
(C. C. i9o6); Dam v. Kirk La Shelle Co., 175 Fed. 9o2, 99 C. C. A. 392
(igio). Contra is White-Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 147 Fed. 226,
77
C. A. 368 (906).
"See Notes I and 2, supra. Section 4 Of the Act of 1909 provides: "That

the works for which copyright may be secured under this Act shall include all
the writings of an author."
2"Kalem Co. v. Harper Brothers, 222 U. S. 55, 56 L. ed. 92, 32 Sui. Ct.
2o (1911). For a case where a mere vulgar display was held'not to be a "dramatic composition," see Barnes v. Miner, 122 Fed. 480 (C. C. 1903). Under Copyright Office Rules (Section 8) "dramatic compositions" does not include "moving picture shows."
' See Gaumont v. Hatch, 2o8 Fed. 378 (D. C. 1913). Under the English
Acts the author is "the person who invents the plot or arranges the incidents":
Copinger on The Law of Copyright, 5 ed. (g15), at p. 252.
'Harper & Bros. v. Kalem Co, supra'in Note 2; Klein v. Beach, 232 Fed.
24o, 246 (D. C. 1916), affirmed in 239 Fed. io8, 151 C. C. A. 282 (917).

SKalem Co. v. Harper Bros., supra in Note i5, at p. 6r.
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a motion picture shall be regarded as "published." 19 Weil suggests
that, on its analogy to a drama, one public showing of a film would
not be a publication, but that, on its analogy to a book, one sale
under Section 1,
would be.20 Whether a filmis a "literary work" 21L
b, has not been decided. Inasmuch,2 2however, as the Copyright Act
is intended to be liberally construed, it would appear that it should
be so regarded and thus the valuable exclusive right of making their
picture owners
photoplays into novels be granted to those motion
23
whose plots are taken from original scenarios.
Section I of the Act enumerates the various rights belonging to a
copyright proprietor. Copyright, it is clear, is not 2so much a single
right as it is an aggregation of rights and privileges. ' It is, of course,
not to be confused with one of its component parts, viz., the ordinary
property right in the physical objects created under the protection of
the copyright.2 5 By Section i, b, of the Act of 19o9 the exclusive
right is given to transform the copyrighted work into other forms of
"writings" which in turn may be copyrighted. This" section protects
the monopoly of transforming a novel into a drama, a drama into a
picture
novel,2 7 a novel 28 or drama into a motion picture, a motion
9
The mointo a drama and probably a motion picture into a novel.
tion picture copyright proprietor may have his films multiplied and
sold or leased."0 He may persotially prepare a novel or drama or both
"Under Section 9 of the Act of 19o9 publication with notice initiates the
copyright. It is, therefore, a matter of importance that the exact statutory
meaning of the word "pubiication" should be determined.. See Section 293 ct
seq. of Weil on Copyright Law, supra in Note 9.
Section 388 of his Copyright Law.
-It is regarded as an "artistic work" under the English Act. See Copinger on The Law of Copyright, supra in Note x6, at p. 25a.
2'See Note 13, supra.
"The exclusive right to novelize a drama had its origin in the Act of
19o9: Fitch v. Young, 230 Fed. 743 (D. C. ipri), affirmed in 239 Fed. io21,
152 C. C. A. 664 (917).
' See Veil, supra in Note 9, Sections 137, 97r, 985.

Section 41 of the Act of i909, supra in Note 6.
" See Harper & Bros. v. Kalem Co., supra in Note 2; Darn v. Kirk La
Shelle Co., .supra in Note 13; Tully v. Triangle Film Corp., 229 Fed. a9g/ (D.
C. 1916) ; Underhill v. Schenck 187 N. Y. S. 589 (920, reversed in x93 N.
Y. S. 745 (App. Div. z922).
" See Fitch v. Young, supra in Note 23, at p. 745.
Photo Drama, etc., Co. v. Social, etc., Corp., 213 Fed. 374 (D. C.
'See
1914), affirmed ill 220 Fed. 448, 137 C. C. A. 4z (1915); Selig Polyscope Co. v.
Unicorn Film Co., x63 N. Y. S. 6z (1917).

'As suggested supra on this page.
' For brief explanations of the system of producing and dealing in films,
see Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm. of Ohio, 236 U. S. 230, 234, 59 L.
ed. 55Z, 553, 35 Sup. Ct. 387, 388 (1914); Pathe Exchange, Inc. v. Cobb, 2oz

-
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and copyright them.31 Or, if he so chooses, he may assign the whole
aggregation of rights given by the Act, or he may assign each separately, or he may assign some and retain others 32
'Whether a grant by a copyright proprietor is an assignment or
merely a license must depend upon the intention of the parties. Assignments are expressly provided for by the Act," licenses are entirely proper.3 4 - Whether any particular assignment by a copyright
proprietor includes all the assignor's rights depends in each case upon
a construction of the particular contract. A grant by the owner of a
drama of "all dramatic rights" would prinza facie appear to carry
with it the right to produce the drama as a photoplay.35 Yet a grant
of "the sole and exclusive license and liberty to produce, perform and
represent" a drama over a period of years was construed, upon close
scrutiny of other clauses in the contract, as not assigning the photoplay rights.36 In the same case there was found an implied negative
covenant by the grantor not to use this ungranted portion of the copyright estate to the detriment and perhaps destruction of the grantee's
estate. In one case 37 a contract made in 19oo assigning to one party
the right to produce the play at "first class theatres" was held not to
permit the other party subsequently to assign to a third the photoplay
rights, though at the time of entering into the contract neither party
had any thought of motion pictures or of rights in them.
Infringement of copyright consists in wrongful utilization of a
right possessed- by another by virtue of the Act.38 The right of the
App. Div. 45o (N. Y. 1922); Frolich on The Law of Motion Pictures (1917),
p. 2T4' See

Section r of the Act of z9og, supra in Note 6.

, See Photodrama, etc., Co. v. Social, etc., Corp., supra in Note 28; New

Fiction Pub. Co. v. Star Co, supra in Note 3; Tully v. Triangle Film Corp.,

supra in Note 26.
"Section 42 of the Act of i9og. Section 44 provides for recording assignments. An unrecorded assignment of photoplay rights is void as to a subsequent assignee without notice: Photodrama, etc., Co. v. Social, etc., Corp.,
supra in Note 28. But an infringer gets no profection from Section 44; New

Fiction Pub, Co. v. Star Co., supra in Note 3, at p. ,46.
"See Tully v. Triangle Film Corp., suprx in Note _26; Klein v. Beach,
supra in Note 17; Hart v. Fox, 166 N. Y. S.793 (x91).
"See Photodrama, etc., Co. v. Social etc., Corp, supra in Note 28; Tully
v. Triangle Film Corp., supra in Note 26; Harper Bros. v. Klaw, 232 Fed.
6og, 6W2 (i6); Lipzin v. Gordin, 166 N. Y. S.792 (19TS); Hart v. Fox,
supra in Note 34. If the phrase "on the stage" is used the contract will
probably be construed as not granting the photoplay rights: Klein v. Beach,
supra in note 17.
.2Manners v. Morosco, 252 U.-S. 317, 64 L ed. 590, 40 Sup. Ct. 335 (1920).

Frohman v. Fitch, 149 N. Y. S.633, 164 App. Div. 231 (19T4). Due to
the rapid development of the motion pictures the date of the making of the
contract may be important. See Klein v. Beach, supra in Note 17.
See Chap. XVII of Veil on Cop'right Law.
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copyright proprietor's grantee to sue to protect his interests from
infringement will depend on whether he is deemed an assignee or a
licensee. 9 The monopoly which is granted a copyright proprietor
and his assigns is on the uses which may be made of the originator's
expression of ideas.4 ' The Act does not afford protection against
other expressions of the same ideas."' ."An author cannot by a suggestion gain exclusive control of a field of thought on a particular
subject." 42 Thus, a motion picture film based on a novel was held
not to infringe the copyrighted book and, as a photograph, not subject
to an injunction. The film represented merely the director's idea of
what the novelist had expressed in words. But when the photoplay
was flashed on the screen the exhibition was a drama and the
copyright proprietor's exclusive right of dramatization under Section
i was thereby violated."
After a novel or drama has been dedicated 44 to the public or the copyright period has terminated, any one
may produce a photoplay and secure copyright on it-but he gets
thereby no monopoly on all motion picture rights.'
Any one else
may subsequently produce a photoplay based on the same story and
with the same title,6 so long as he is not guilty of copying the films
previously produced.
Entirely apart from the matter of copyright the owner of a
photoplay may be protected in Equity on the ground that a competitior has been guilty of unfair competition. The law against unfair competition has a threefold object: first, to protect the honest
trader; second, to punish the dishonest trader; third, to protect the
piblic from deception. 47 In the case of theatrical productions and
'The respective rights of assignees and licensees are treated in Section
etscq. of Weil on Copyright Law.
,Kalcm Co. v. Harper Bros., supra in Note 15. See Section 499 of Veil
on Copyright Law.
"Atlas Mfg. Co. v. Street and Smith, 204 Fed. 398, 12z C. C. A. 568
1534

(i913) ; Bachman v. Belasco, 224 Fed. 811, 140 C. C. A. 263 (1915).
' Dam v. Kirk La Shelle Co., supra in Note 13. "The statute has not

provided for the protection of the intellectual conception apart from the thing
. . .": White-Smith Music Co. v. Apollo Co., supra in Note 3, at

produced
p. 17.

'Harper

Bros. v. Kalem Co., supra in Note 2.

" "Dedication" and "publication" are not synonymous terms: Weil on
Copyright Law, Section 297.
"O'Neil v. General Film Co., 171 App. Div. 854, 8357 (N. Y. 1916). See
also Atlas Mfg. Co. v. Street and Smith, supra in Note 41, at p. 4o3.
"See Glaser v. St. Elmo Co., 175 Fed. 26 (C. C. itog). This right is
subject to the rule agaiist unfair competition. Merriam v. Ogilvie, 159 Fed. 638,
88 C. C. A. 596 (9o8).
Florence IMfg. Co. v. J. C. Dowd & Co., 178 Fed. 73 (C. C. A. igro);
Gulden v. Chance, 182 Fed. 303, io5 C. C. A. 16 (igo); Atlas Mfg. Co. v.

Street and Smith, supra in Note 41. See cases collected in American Digest
(2nd Dec. ed.): Trade Mlark, Section 68-Nature of Unfair Competition.

NOTES

photoplays relief on this ground usually is sought where use of
the same, or a closely similar, title by a competitor is alleged. 48 There
is doubt as to the copyrightability of a title by itself.4 0 Inasmuch,
however, as Section 5 provides that copyrightable works shall include "all the writings of an author," and Section 3 .protects "all
the copyrightable component parts," it appears that a title should be
afforded protection as any other writing. There is no question but
that it may be protected in conjunction with the work to which it
belongs. " In the case of Klast v. Gencral Film Co.,2 use of the title
of a photoplay was enjoined on the ground of unfair competition,
at the instance of one whose drama had achieved a wide reputation
under the same title, even though the plot of the photoplay was dissimilar to that of the drama. This appears to be the first case In
'which a photoplay title was judicially recognized as an object of
unfair competition with the title of a drama. Today dramas and
photoplays are well recognized by the courts as competitors. 2
Two. recent New York cases's are of interest. In each the exhibition of a photoplay was enjoined on the ground that it was an
unfair competitor of a stage production with the same title. In
neither was there any sound basis for fear that any "ordinary purchaser in the exercise of ordinary care and caution in such mat,sSee Atlas Mfg. Co. v. Street and Smith, supra in Note 41; Manners v.
Triangle Film Corp., 247. Fed. 3oi, 's9 C. C. A. 395 (1917); Nat. Picture
Theatres, Inc. v. Foundation Film Corp., -66 Fed. 208 (C. C. A. 1920); International Film Service Co. v. Associated Producers, Inc., 273 Fed. 585 (D.C.
192t); Klaw v. General Film Co., r54 N. Y, S. 9&3 (I9rS); Dickey v. Mutual
Film Corp., i6o N. Y. S. 6og (ixg6); Selig Polyscope Co. v. Unicorn Film
Co., supra in Note 28; Selig Polyscope Co. v. Mutual Film Corp., 169 N. Y.
S. 369, 1113 (i918); Underhill v. Schenc, 187 N. Y. S. 589 (i92) and 193
N. Y. S. 745 (App. Div: ig92); Goldin -. Clarion Phot6plays, Inc., 195 N.

Y. S. 455 (192).

"Glaser v. St. Elmo Co., supra in Note 46 at p. 278. See also Section 59x
of Weil on Copyright Law. "Copyright does not extend to the title. An
author or dramatist acquires the benefit of the copyright law in every part
of his work, except where he most needs it-in the title itself": Frolich on The
Law of Motion Picures, p. 403.
' See Kaw v. General Film Co.; Dickey v. Mutual Film Corp.; Selig Poly.
scope Co. v. Unicorn Film Co.; Nat. Picture Theatres, Inc. v. Foundation Film
-Corp.; Goldin v. Clarion Photoplays, Inc.-all supra in Note 48.
'Supra in Note 48.
"Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., supra in Note 15; Manners v. Morosco,
supra in Note 36; Mfanners v. Triangle Film Corp., supra in Note 48. But,
since books and motion pictures are not in the same class, the public will not
be deceived and there will be no basis for an action based on unfair competition between them: Atlas Mfg. Co. v. Street and Smith, supra in Note 41.
'Underhill v. Schenck, and Goldin v. Clarion Photoplays, Inc., jupia in

Note 48.
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ters" ' would be deceived into believing that an exhibition of the
photoplay was a presentation of the drama, or that the photoplay
was a product of the theatrical producer. Though the gist of an action based on unfair competition is generally said to be the deception of the public, "5 it is evident that this element need not be present where the defendant is profiting from an unfair use of that
which belongs to the plaintiff." The court will refuse to act only
where neither of these two elements is present.
The status of news reels under the freedom of the press clauses
of the Federal and State constitutions is at present the novel subject of adjudication in the New York courts. 7 It was argued with
great force that these reels were in the same category as newspapers
and were entitled to freedom from censorship prior to their exhibition. The Appellate Division-of the Supreme Court held them to
be not so privileged. 8 It said :" "The statute does not prohibit the
making or selling of films, but regulates only the use of the thing
in a certain way." If it be admitted that news reels are in the same
category as newspapers (which the court was not ready to admit)
the determination of the time when they shall be regarded as "published" becomes important.0 0 If publication occurs when the film is
sold or leased, censorship before exhibition would appear proper; if
not until the pictures are flashed on the screen, it would appear improper. The-final decision on this interesting point appears a matter of considerable doubt.
C. Z. G., Jr.
.'McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245, 255, 24 L. ed. 828, 832 (877).
"B. V. D. Co. v. Kaufman & Baer, 272 Pa. 240, 1x6 Ad. 508 (1922);
Hopkins Amusement Co. v. Frohman, 202 111. 541 (1903); Selig Polyscope
Co. v. Mutual Film Corp., stpra in Note 48; Ball v. Broadway Bazaar, 194 N.
Y. S. 29, 435 (19o9). The title must have acquired a secondary significance
before the public will be misled: Manners v. Triangle Film Corp., supra in
Note 48; Int. Film. Service Co. v. Associated Producers, Inc., supra in Note
48.
zSee Dickey v. 'tutual Film Corp.; Selig Polyscope Co. v.-Unicorn Film
Service Corp.; Underhill v. Schenck; Goldin v. Clarion Photoplays, Inc.all supra in Note 48.
Iathe Exchange, nc. v. Cobb, supra in Note 30.
"It is the show or spectacle which is aimed at by the statute and such a
show or spectacle is certainly not an essential incident to the conduct of the
press. It is a thing separate and apart from it. We do not think that the
* . . news reel, so far as it becomes a part of such show or spectacle in
such a public place of amusement, is a part of the press of the country": Hinman, J., on page 458 of the opinion, supra in Note 57.
"At page 458 of the opinion.
o,supra.
'See -Note --

NOTES

AN AUTOMOBILE OWNER'S LI,\BILITY UNDER TIIE FAmILY PURPOSE DocTRINE.-Where an automobile is purchased for the pleastre, convenience and use of the owner's family, any member of the
family using it for his own pleasure is deemed to be the servant of
said owner in so doing. If a tort results from the negligent operation
by such member, the owner is thereby made liable, since the former
was within the scope of his service. This is the so-called "family
purpose doctrine." Under it the owner of the family car is held
liable, even where the negligent operator was an adult member of the
family.1

In Markle v. Perot,2 a recent Pennsylvania case, the owner was

held not liable, where the injury was caused by the negligence of an
adult son. The adult son, with the owner's permission, was driving
the family car for an errand of his own, when the accident occurred.
The court stated that the circumstance that the automobile may have
been used for the pleasure, comfort or convenience of the family,

was not sufficient to establish the owners liability.3 In Linch v. Dob-

son, a contemporaneous decision of the Nebraska Supreme Court,
where the facts were very similar, the owner was held liable for the
negligence of his adult son. The court said that the father's control
over the adult son's use of the automobile was no different than it
would have been had the son been a minor. Where the car is kept for
the use and pleasure of the family, and one member is using it for
his own pleasure, this member of the family is acting as an agent in
furthering the purpose of the owner. He is as much an agent as
though several other members of the family.were with him in the
car, since his own pleasure is part of the family use.5
These two cases illustrate how different jurisdictions are diametrically opposed to each other, concerning this important liability.
Since there is no ground on which the decisions can be reconciled, the
problem becomes a real one. When a person buys an automobile for
the use of his family, he must realize that he cannot always run it
himself. In many cases a chauffeur is employed at a fixed compensa-

'The majority of jurisdictions in the United States have wholly or partially accepted this doctrine. Quite a number, however, have entirely repudiated it.
1273 Pa. 4, i6

Atl. .W4 (19n).

'Recent cases in accord are: Van Blaricom v. Dodgson, 220 N. Y. iiI,
ix5 N. E. 443 (917); Blair v. Broadwater, 12i Va. 3Ol, 93 S. E. 63i (1997);
Watkins v. Clark, 103 Kan. 629, 176 Pac. 131 (iqtS); Myers v. Shipley, 1x6
At. 645 (Md., 1922).
188 N. W. 227 (NCb., 1922).
'Recent cases in accord are: Denison v. 1fcNorton, 228 Fed. 401, 142 C.
C. A. 631 (i916); Lewis v. Steel, 52 "Mont.300, 157 Pac. 5 (i916) ; Crittenden v. Mfurphy, 36 Cal. App. 803, 173 Pac. 595 (igiS); Johnson v. Smith, 143
Minn. 3.0, 173 N. W. 675 (i9T9); Jones v. Cook, ii S. E. 828 (W. Va., 92z2).
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tion, and if the chauffeur is negligent, while driving the owner's family about, it is certain in all jurisdictions that the owner is liable.
On the theory that the paid chauffeur is acting within the scope of
his employment the doctrine of respondeat superior is held to apply.
But very often a paid chauffeur is not employed, and the owner entrusts this duty to a member of the family. If the doctrine of
respondeat superior still applies, then the owner is liable, and con,versely the owner is freed from liability if the doctrine of respondeat
superiorcannot be extended to these analogous facts.
This being the problem at issue, it becomes necessary to examine
the respondeat superior doctrine. Baron Parke said that since the
master is not guilty of any offense, he is only liable for the negligence
of his servant because the law makes him so liable.0 Since this is a
liability without a breach of any duty, it is an anomaly in the law of
Torts. Sir Frederick Pollock in his treatise on the Law of Torts
zaid, "No reason for the rule, at any rate no satisfactory one, is commonly given in opr books." 7 Professor Mechem advances four possible reasons for this doctrine. First, the master put the force in motion, and therefore can be said to have some control, since his starting
of the force was optional. Second, the master gets the benefit of
the servant's activity and therefore should bear any burden ensuing
therefrom. Third, the master places the servant in a position where
his negligence can cause injury. Fourth, public expediency demands
that the master, who is usually the pecuniarily responsible person,
should be held liable.' These four reasons are found to be applicable to
the "family purpose doctrine." The owner can prevent or allow the use
of the automobile, as he sees fit, he gets a benefit from the use for
which he bought the automobile, he places the member of the family in
a position where his -negligence can cause injury, and here again public expediency demands that a, solvent person be made liable. Chief
Justice Sharswood said "that the principle of respondeat superior
should be upheld and maintained for the general security of society." 9
The l.ability of the owner of a family automobile seems equally necessary for the general security of society. In a recent Tennessee case
where the "family purpose doctrine" was discussed and upheld, the
court spoke of the practical administration of justice and imposed a.
liability upon the owner, largely because of the demands of public
expediency."'

A fifth reason for the doctrine of respondeat,superior is that it
'Joel v. Morrison, 5 Car. & P. 5o

(Eng. 1834).

ISth Ed. 77.

'These reasons are set forth in an article on the Employer's Liability in
(igxo).
44 A.tmE. L. Rmv.-i
"1-Tays v. Miller, 77 Pa. St. 238,241 (874).
"King v. Smythe, 14o Tenn. 217, -t S. AV. 296 (918).
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is an historical growth from the conception.of the unity which existed
between maste -and slave. 1 In a.Kentucky case-12 bearing the significant date .of 1864, where a son was negligent in driving his father's
carriage to a "picnic,"..the' court held the" father liable, stating "that
the son. must be regarded as in the -father's eihployment, discharginga duty usually done by a slave, and therefore must, for the purposes
of this suit, be regarded as his father's servant" In some of the
earlier cases, where the "family purpose doctrine" was discussed and
upheld, this part-of the opinion of Judge Williams, in the above case,
was quoted, 3 showing that-the "family purpose dodrine' may have
its roots in the very soil from which the doctrine of respondeatsuperior is said to have sprung. Thus the reasons supporting both
doctrines,.,whether sound or unsound, seem to indicate that the owner's liability under the "family purpose doctrine" is a logical growth
of the law, based on the analogous doctrine of respondcat'superior.
The situation has unfortunately been complicated by apartial acceptance of the "family purpose doctrine" by some courts. The New
Jersey Supreme Court, a' few years ago, held at- automobile owner
liable when the son was accompanied by another member of the owner's family, 4 but-had refused, six years before, so to hold where the
family member was driving' alone in the machine. 5 This distinctioin
is very difficult to' understand." If it-is within 'the scope of the
owner's 'business when the' sorf drives an automobile furnished for
the family use, it is just as'much his business when the son is driving
alone as when he is accompanied by members of the family. Perhaps this court, in making -such a distinction -six years after the rejection of the "family purpose doctrine,"' was thereby taking a. step
toward an ultimate acceptance of the doctrine. A similar situation
is found in Illinois. - In Arkin v. Page1 6 where the son at the time of
the accident was driving the family car on his way to matriculate at
a summer school, the court refused to allow k recovery against the
owner. Two years later in Graham v. Page "I the owner was held
liable by the same court, where the injury occurred while the owner's
daughter was going to get ier shoes repaired. The only apparent distinguishing feature.between the two cases is that the family purpose
includes going to get shoes, but does not include going to get an education. -This distinction, without a. real difference, is perhaps another
See Dean Wigmoie's article 'n the history of the liability in 7 HARV. TL
Rix. 315, 383 (1894). 12Lahbroolc-v.
Patten, i Duvall S16 (Ky. M6).,
IStowe v. Morris, 147' Ky. 388, T44 S. AV. 5:. (i912), and M'cNeal v.
33 OM. 449, i26 Pac. 742 (1912).
McKain,
28
Missell v. Hayes, 86 N. J. L 349, 91 AtL 322 (1914).
"Doran v. Thompson, 76 N. J. L 755, 71 At. 296 (go).'
8 7 IIL 420, 123 N. E 30 (I919).
-300 Ill. 40, 132 N. E. 817 (19211.
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example of a court taking a step toward reversing itself concerning
this doctrine. 18 In Massachusetts, although the "family purpose doctrine" has not been accepted, nevertheless in such cases the courts
have left it to the jury to decide whether the evidence shows that the
son was the father's servant." This placing the matter in the hands
of the jury will probably lead to some confusion in that jurisdiction.
In Missouri the doctrine was accepted in the Appellate Court,20 but
later the Supreme Court repudiated the doctrine as unsofind.2 In
New York the owner has never been held liable for such negligence of
his son, although frequently the New York courts of original jurisdiction have accepted and applied the 'family purpose doctrine." 22
In this curious division of authority, Pennsylvania has heretofore been considered as one of the jurisdictions which had accepted
the "family purpose doctrine." This was due to the cses of Moon v.
MatthCws 23 and Hazzard v. Carstairs24 where the family use of the
automobile was considered as within the scope of the owner's business. In both cases, however, the automobile was being driven by a
paid chauffeur acting under the direction of a member of the family,
so that any statement which could be construed as an adoption of
the "family purpose doctrine" must obviously be considered as obiter.
In Crouse v. Lubin2 5 the defendant kept an automobile for the use
of her mother, and Mr. Justice Walling stated "that one who keeps
an automobile for the benefit of his family is prinafacie responsible
for its management when in use for that purpose." Here too, the negligent operator was a paid chauffeur, which prevents this statement
from being of binding authority. Relying on these cases, the "family
purpose doctrine" was accepted by a lower Pennsylvania court 20
and also by the Pennsylvania Superior Court 2 in a case where a
mother was held liable for the negligence of her son while he was
driving her automobile for his own health. The case of Markle v.
Perot 21 is therefore of great importance, since it is the first definite
Il "Ssignificant to notice that Ar. Justice Farmer, who wrote the later
opinion, also wrote a dissenting opinion in the earlier case.
" 9Bourne v. Whitman, 2o9 Afass. 155, 95 N. E. 404 (911); Smith v.
Jordon, 2ri Mass. 269, 97 N. E. 76t (1912), Weiner v. Mairs, 234 Mass. z56,
125 N. F_. 49 (igxg).
"Daily v. Maxwell, 152 Mo. App. 415, 133 S. NV. 351 (191).
Hayes v. Hogan, 273 Mo. i, 2oo S. IV. 286 (r917). '
' The most recent New York case is Kohlmeier v. Allen, 194 N. Y. S.
s97 (1922), which again rejects the "family purpose doctrine."
S227 Pa. 448, 76 At. 219 (1910).
24244 Pa. 12-2, go Atl. 556 (1914).
'26o Pa. 329, 13 Atl 725 (igr8).
"'Ruskovie v. Linder, 64 'Pitt. L J. 144 (Pa. 1929).
,Fox v. Cahorosky, 66 Pa. Super. zi (1917).
Supra in Note z
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decision on this disputed question by the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court.
Because public expediency calls for such liability, there is a
strong urge on the courts to hold the owner liable, and various reasons have been advanced. For example, an early New York case held
the owner liable on the ground that an automobile was a new and
dangerous instrument, 9 but this was speedily overruled. In a few
jurisdictions the liability has been created by statute."0 It is of interest
to note that a statute ' making an automobile owner liable for injury caused by his automobile, even when driven without his consent, was declared unconstitutional on the ground that
it deprived the
32
owner of his property without due process of law.
The final outcome of the confusion which this doctrine has
caused is indeed doubtful. Based on an analogous extension of the
doctrine of rcspondeat superior, which, although dubious and unsound to some, seems to be sound in its fundamental analysis, the
"family purpose doctrine" appears to be another example of the
recognized flexibility of the common law. Whether the flexibility here
shown will survive the touch of a judiciary, already exasperated by a
too great extension of the doctrine of respondcat superior in other
directions, is difficult to foretell.
S.P.C.
TnE PRIVILEGE PROTECTING ONE AccusED OF CRIME FROM BEING COM3dPELLED TO TESTIFY AGAINST

HIMSELF.--"No right has been

the subject of more jealous care than that which protects one accused
of crime from being compelled to testify against himself."'L This
privilege against self-crimination 2 has been expressly provided for
in the United States Constitution S and in the constitutions of every
'Ingraham v. Stockamore, 63 Misc. 114, ri8 N. Y. S. 399 (19o9).
- " In California, Statutes of 1917, Sec. i8, p. 407; and in Michigan, Sec.
Acc No. 3o2 of Public Acts of i915.
, Michigan, Act No. 318 of Public Acts of 19o9.
"Levyn v. Koppin, 183 Mich.

232,1 49

N. W. 993 (i914).

11r. Justice Day, now of the U. S. Supreme Court in McKnight v. United
States, 115 Fed. 972, 54 C. C. A. 358 (I902).
' The privilege was born out of the mcdi-eval clash between the king's
court of justice and the Court Christian, &¢henopposition was raised not to
the practice of questioning the accused but to .he practice of the court in doing it without jurisdiction. Not until the latter half of the seventeenth century, was the privilege extended, as we know it today. Wigmore in 5 HARV.
L. R. 7x (1891), and 15 I ARV. L Rav. 6io (1902).
'The Fifth Amendment provides, ;nter alia, that no person "aball be cornpels d in a criminal case to be a witness against himself"' It has been well
settled that 0hii is restrictive of federal action only, however. Barron v.
1ohiti-more, 7 Peters 243, 8 L. ed. 672 (U. S. 1833).
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state in the Union,4 save two 8 -so necessary has this protection been
regarded for the accused. The wordings of the constitutions differ,
of course, in outlining the privilege. One constitution protects the accused from "testifying,"" another from "furnishing evidence," 7 and
still another protects him from "being a witness." 8 Yet it has been
held that this variety of phrasing is immaterial in that it neither broaden. nor narrows the scope of the immunity. 9
But exactly what is the scope of this immunity, just what are
the limitations of this doctrine founded on the old maxim of nemo
tenetur scipsum accusare?10 This question may well be asked and
especially in view of the case of Commonwealth v. Valeroso,1 decided
recently by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania. The court in that
case held that the mere demand. made by the Commonwealth on the
accused to produce a letter constituted a violation of his constitutional
privilege, because of the prejudicial inference which the jury might
draw from his refusal to comply with the demand.
It appears from the cases that two elements must be present for
the privilege to be violated. First, the accused must be compelled
to incriminate himself, 2 for compulsion, it has been said, is the keynote of the prohibition. 3 Second, the compulsion must be directed
by legal process against the accused person in the capacity of a witness; it must be testinonialcompulsion.2'
At first the guaranty only protected the accused from giving oral
testimony."5 This was due to the fact that in the ecclesiastical court,
where opposition to inquisitorial methods was waged for two cen• Stimson "Federal and State Constitutions of the United States," Book 3,
par. 135. For example, Article i, Section 9 of the Pennsylvania Constitution,
provides that "he [the accused] cannot be compelled to give evidence against
himself." Pub. L i87, p. 158.
'New Jersey and Iowa. In these states, in the absence of constitutional
provision the right is held to have common law sanction. State v. Miller, 71 N.
.J. L. 527, 6o Atl. 202 (19o4); State v. Height, 117 Iowa 65o, g N. W. 935

(1902).
'Colorado, Art. I, See. i&

'Massachusetts, Dec. of -R., Art. r2.

'California, Art. I, Sec. 13.
'State v. Quarles, r3 Ark. 307 (18r3); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.
S. 547, 35 L. ed. 1110, I Sup. Ct. 95 "(i892).
"Broom's Legal Maxims, 8th Ed., p. 761. The maxim was first used by
Coke as counsel in the case of Collier v. Collier, 4 Leon. 194 (Eng. z589).
11273 Pa. 213, ii6 Atl. 83. (March, 5922).
"It must appear that stich strong compulsion was used as to rob the accused of volition in the matter. Eaker v. State, 4 Ga. App. 649, 6z S. . 99

(1908).
"People v. Kent, io Potto Rico 325 (t9o6).

People Y. Gardner, 144 N. Y. 119, 38 N. E. 1003 (1894).
Wbi,,more, Evidence, Vol. 4, p. 3123.
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turies,1 8 the procedure was to place the accused under oath and wring
from his own lips an admission of guilt. Now it is universally conceded that the privilege also exempts the accused from being compelled to produce books and papers ". and all chattels which are ca5
pable at all of being made the subject of evidence.'
own body in eviaccused's
the
of
offering
But on the question
dence, the courts are not of the same harmonious opinion."9 Some
courts have held that it is a violation of his constitutional right to
compel the accused to exhibit himself, for the purpose of identification
2
and comparison.2 0 There are decisions contra l however, based on
to bodily exhibition,
extended
were
privilege
if
the
that
the reasoning
then logically the accused could objeft even to being present at his
trial,2 ' and it is necessary, of course, for him to be in court while he
is being .tried.23
This briefly outlines the scope of the privilege against self-crimination. In Commonwealth v.Valcroso 21 there was compulsion, and
furthermore testimonial compulsion of sufficient nature to invoke the
protection of nemo tcnctur szipsum accusare. Demanding the letter
of him in open court was forcing him to testify, if not by his words,
equally significant
then by his silence, which to the jury might appear
25
as any syllables which he might have voiced.
The procedure of the ex officio oath was summarily compelling the accused to testify in cases where he was entitled to remain silent unless witnesses were produced against him or his general bad repute shown. This
practice was condemned by Chief Justice Coke in 12 Coke 26 (Eng. 16o7).
" Rex v. Purnell, i W. BL 37 (Eng. 1749) ; Boyd v. United States, xs6 U.
S. 6x6, 29 L. ed. 746, 6 Sup. Ct. 524 (1885); Bbyle v. Smithman, 146 Pa.
255, 23 AtI. 397 (2892).
"As for example, shoes, Moss v. State, 146 Ala. 686, 40 So. 340 (x9o6);
a pistol, Davis v. State, 4 Ga. App. 2r74, 6i S. E. 132 (i9o8).
is x6 C. J., p. 567 and cases there cited.
Wash.
^'Walker v. State, 7 Tex. App. 246 (8M) ; State v. Nordstrom, 75o6, 36 Pac. 382 (1893). The leading case, however, holding that bodily exhibition was a violation of the privilege was State v. Ah Chucy, 14 Nev. 79
(1879), which was decided by a divided court and accompanied by a strong
dissenting opinion.
. State v. Jacobs, So N. C. 259 (x858) ; People v. Wolcott; 5 Mich. 62, 17

N. NV. 78 (1883).

= "If an accused person were to refuse to be removed from jail to the
court room for trial claiming that he was privileged not to expose his features to the witnesses for identification, it is not difficult to conceive the judicial reception which would be given to such a claim." Wigmore, Evidence,
Vol. 4, P. 31282 Amendment VI to the United States Constitution provides that "the
accusd shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses
against him." Like clauses are contained in most of the state constitutiotis.
2 Note ir, supra.
74
State v. Markley,
' M.cKnight v. United States, stpra, in Note i;
6
Iowa, 695, 39 N. W. i (i888) ; Gillespie v. State, 5 Okla. Crim. 5,1, 115 Pac.
620 (1911).
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The most learned contemporary text-writer on the subject of evidence has urged that the privilege protecting the accused from testimonial compulsion be kept within the strictest possible limits. 26 But
why cannot the privilege be discarded altogether? Once there was
necessity for it, to combat the :.quisiterial procedure of the ecclesiastical courts and the Court of the Star Chamber,27 but the day of
rack and thumb-screw methods has passed and at present there appears to be little reason for the rule. The absurdity of some of the reasons which have been advanced in support of the privilege must be
evident from a mere glance at them.2 There is the "old woman's reason," the essence of which is contained in the word "hard," that is,
hard upon a man to be obliged to crininate himself. Then the "fox
hunter's reason," which introduces the idea of fairness, that the accused, as the hunted fox, should have his chance of escape. There is
the argument, too, that it is giving sanction to torture to allow the
accused to be questioned; and finally the absurd sophism that whatever the inquisition did was wrong; this is one of the things which
the inquisition did and therefore this is wrong.
These represent, obviously, weak logical support for the privilege. Entitled to more recognition among the arguments advanced
in favor of the immunity are those which go to show that our system of prosecution would "suffer morally" 2 if compulsory self-disclosure were allowed. These urge that to permit the accused to be
compelled to testify would lead to a laziness on the part of the prosecutors, who would develop then a tendency to rely chiefly, if not exclusively, on the testimony of the accused; ignoring other sources of
evidence which might prove valuable. The exercise of the power to
extract answers also, it is argued, -might readily lead to bullying and
browbeating a-nd even to physical force and torture. But these arguments, too, are of little weight because the assumption that the prosecution would so abuse its office, especially in court, is highly conjectural.
Regardless of the care with which the privilege has been so far
fostered, there is much to be said for the view that it should now be
abolished. It is the traditional remnant of just opposition against official torture, long obsolete. Jn a moment of temporary agitation
against an inquisitorial practice inaugurated on the Continent at the
Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. 4, p. 3102.
-'SirJ. F. Stephens, "History of Criminal Law," Vol. 1, 342.
Mr. Jeremy Bentham, "Ratic.nvle of Judicial Evidence," b. IX, pt. IV,
chap. III (Bowrings cd., Vol. VII, p. 452). The fault with this writer's criticism of the privilege appears to be in his assumption that the accused is always guilty.
Wigmore, Evidence, Vol. 4, p. 3o97.
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time, the immunity was incorporated into our fundamental law,3° but
there is no need sentimentally to retain it now. The privilege which
exempts the accused from being compelled to give evidence is extremely undesirable at this time in that it unquestionably shields
crime and offers protection for the guilty criminal.3 ' In this day
when crime is so deplorably rampant it seems extremely foolhardy
to continue, without reason, the practice of making each guilty criminal "the fond object of the court's doting tenderness, guiding him at
every step in the path of unrectitude and lifting up his feet lest he
fall into the pits digged' for him by justice and by his own offenses." 32
S. .AH.
At the time of the Colonial Conventions, agitation was being carried on
in France against the inquisitorial features of the Ordonance of 1670. It is interesting to note, in this connectien, that the privilege is not allowed today in
France or in any of the Continental countries.
Chief Justice Appleton, "Rules of Evidence," Chap. VI, p. 134.
"Wigmore, "Evidence," Vol. 4, P. S3Io.

